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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Probably one of the most controversial topics in the fields of labor law
and alternative dispute resolution is whether it should be permissible for a
union to waive an employee's right to have statutory rights enforced in a
judicial forum, particularly those rights protected under antidiscrimination
statutes, in the context of a collectively-bargained agreement that requires
arbitration for resolution of employer-employee disputes. The Supreme
Court fueled the controversy when it decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.' in 1991-a case that held in favor of such waivers in the
context of individual employment agreements, distinguishing its earlier
"anti-waiver" case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,2 which involved a
collective-bargaining agreement (CBA).
Gilmer represented the growing trend of the Court to resolve concerns
regarding the scope of arbitral disputes in favor of arbitration. 3 Indeed,
despite Gilmer's explicit effort to distinguish itself from Gardner-Denver,4
debate and some uncertainty continue as to whether Gardner-Denver should
be given any effect at all in the context of CBAs;5 and one Circuit has held
that Gilmer did indeed abrogate Gardner-Denver.6
* 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
'500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
3 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (stating that "questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration") (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
4 See id. at 35.
5 See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
(Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. Rv. 591 (1997); William H.
Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for Commercial
Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against Discrimination in Employment: A
Discussion and Proposals for Change, 14 Omuo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 29, 51-53
(1998); George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and
Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMp. L.
177 (1998).
6 See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880-881,
882-885 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Gilmer requires enforcement of a CBA's
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In its most recent decision on the matter, Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp.,7 the Court had an opportunity to relieve the Gardner-
DenverlGilmer tension, but opted not to. By a unanimous vote, 8 the Court
fashioned a rule stating that if a waiver of statutory rights in a CBA is
enforceable, such a waiver must be stated in "clear and unmistakable"
language. 9 The Court stated that it did not have to decide whether explicit
waivers are enforceable because it held that no such waiver existed in the
case before it. 10
II. TWO SEMINAL CASES LEADING TO WRIGHT: THE GARDNER-
DENVER/GILMER TENSION
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In this 1974 decision, the Supreme Court held that a mandatory
arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement does not preclude a
plaintiff from filing his Title VII11 claim in court. 12
Alexander, a black former employee, filed a grievance under the
collective-bargaining agreement in force at the time. 13 In his initial
grievance statement, Alexander did not allege racial discrimination; 14 he
did not make such an allegation until the final pre-arbitration step of the
mandatory arbitration provision in the context of civil rights). Note that, since Gilmer,
the vast majority of circuits have upheld the right of an employee to sue under various
statutes without having to resort to the arbitration clause in a CBA. See, e.g.,
Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758, 762
(9th Cir. 1998) (ruling under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)); Penny v. United
Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 413-414 (6th Cir. 1997) (ruling under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1453-1454
(10th Cir. 1997) (ruling under Title VII), vacated on other grounds, 118 S. Ct. 2364
(1998); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526-527 (11th Cir.
1997) (ruling under the ADA); Varner v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209,
1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (ruling under Title VII).
7 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
8 See id. at 392.
9 Id. at 396-397.
10 See id.
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1994) (prohibiting race and gender discrimination).
12 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
13 See id. at 39.
14 See id.
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grievance procedure. 15 The employer rejected his claims of discrimination
and wrongful discharge, triggering the use of arbitration to settle the
dispute. 16
Before the arbitration proceeding, Alexander filed his discrimination
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); 17
and prior to the EEOC's determination, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the
employer. 18 The EEOC eventually determined that there was no reasonable
cause to believe that Alexander's employer violated Title VII.1 9 After both
of these rejections, Alexander filed his Title VII action in federal district
court. 20 The employer argued that Alexander should be bound by the
arbitral decision, and the district court agreed.21 The court of appeals
affirmed the opinion of the district court,22 but the Supreme Court reversed
the appellate decision.23
Emphasizing that "the private right of action [is] an essential means of
obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII," 24 the Supreme Court held that
the arbitral forum is not appropriate for the final resolution of rights
protected by the Act. 25 The Court reasoned that the arbitrator's area of
competence is the interpretation of contracts, not legislation. 26 In addition,
the Court noted that the fact-finding process in arbitration falls far short of
the procedures and rights common to civil trials. 27 The Court further noted
15 See id. at 42.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id. at 42-43.
19 See id. at 43.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 45.
25 See id. at 56-57; see also Daughtrey & Kidd, supra note 5, at 51-53 (discussing
the Court's holding in Gardner-Denver).
26 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-57 (stating that "the specialized
competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land"); see also Daughtrey & Kidd, supra note 5, at 52.
27 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58 (noting that discovery, compulsory
process, and the oath are absent from, or severely limited in, arbitration proceedings);
see also Daughtrey & Kidd, supra note 5, at 52.
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its concern with the fact that the arbitrators in the case before it did not
have to give written reasons for the awards they might give.28
Also significant to Gardner-Denver was the Court's recognition of the
nonmajoritarian nature of Title VII rights, stating that the Act concerns "an
individual's right to equal employment opportunities." 29 In other words,
waiver of the right to a judicial forum for Title VII claims by majoritarian
process (i.e., via a collective-bargaining agreement) and requiring an
employee to rely on the union to represent him in arbitration "would defeat
the paramount congressional purpose behind [the Act]." 30
Related to its concerns surrounding the potential hindrance of rights
that are individual by nature, the Court also expressed its concern over "the
union's exclusive control over the manner and extent to which an individual
grievance is presented," 31 reasoning that, "[i]n arbitration, as in the
collective-bargaining process, the interests of the individual employee may
be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining
unit. "32
B. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Decided in 1991, Gilmer involved a claim of age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 33 (ADEA). 34 In Gilmer, the
Court enforced an individual employment agreement to arbitrate. 35
Robert Gilmer, the plaintiff, was discharged from employment by
Interstate at the age of sixty-two. 36 He was originally hired as a Manager of
Financial Services, and his employment required him to register with
several stock exchanges. 37 As part of his application form for the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), he had agreed to submit to arbitration for
28 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58; see also Daughtrey & Kidd, supra
note 5, at 52.
29 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 58 n.19.
32 Id.
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (prohibiting age discrimination).
34 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
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certain disputes and controversies that might arise between him and
Interstate. 38
After filing an ADEA charge with the EEOC, Gilmer brought suit in
federal district court. 39 The court denied Interstate's motion to compel
arbitration, primarily relying on Gardner-Denver.4° The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the court
of appeals' decision.41
The Court essentially rejected the contention it enunciated in Gardner-
Denver that the arbitral forum is inappropriate for claims arising under
antidiscrimination statutes. 42 Indeed, the Court addressed many of the same
concerns discussed in Gardner-Denver,43 but turned the conclusions made
on those issues in Gardner-Denver on their collective head. 44
Despite its divergence with Gardner-Denver on key issues, the Court in
Gilmer made an explicit attempt to distinguish Gardner-Denver. The Court
noted that an important concern underlying Gardner-Denver "was the
tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights." 45
Because Gilmer personally signed his NYSE application (which contained
the arbitration clause), the Court stated that such concerns did not exist in
the case before it.46
The Court also emphasized that the case before it was being decided
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),47 which represents a "liberal
38 See id.
39 See id. at 24.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 28-33.
43 Two of the concerns addressed by Gardner-Denver and Gilmer are the
inadequacy of the fact-finding process in arbitration and the lack of written opinions and
reasons for the arbitrator's award. See id.
44 See id. Addressing the concern that the limited discovery allowed in arbitration
is inadequate for ADEA claims, the Court opined that "[ilt is unlikely ... that age
discrimination claims require more extensive discovery than other claims that we have
found to be arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims." Id. at 31. As for the lack of
written opinions and reasons for the arbitrator's decision, the Court noted the absence of
that concern in the case before it, stating that the NYSE rules "do require that all
arbitration awards be in writing, and that the awards contain the names of the parties, a
summary of the issues in controversy, and a description of the award issued." Id. at
31-32.
45 Id. at 35.
46 See id.
47 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
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federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 48 Gardner-Denver and the
line of cases following it,49 the Court noted, "were not decided under the
FAA. ,,50
Since the Court's decision in Gilmer, courts of appeals and district
courts have expanded Gilmer to include antidiscrimination statutes such as
the FLSA, ADA, and Title VII. 51
II. WRIGHT: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 18, 1992, Caeser Wright, the plaintiff, was injured while
working as a longshoreman. 52 Seeking worker's compensation for
permanent disability, he settled his claim for a substantial sum and was
awarded social security disability benefits. 53 Wright returned to the docks
in January 1995 and received work with a few stevedoring companies
through union referrals. 54 When those companies discovered he had settled
a claim for permanent disability, they refused to employ him because, they
claimed, his "disability" rendered him unqualified to work as a
longshoreman. 55
Wright approached the union and asked for help in getting back to
work. 56 The collective-bargaining agreement in effect at the time provided
for a grievance procedure for "[m]atters under dispute." '57 The procedure
entailed two levels of grievance committees and, then, if a majority
decision could not be reached by the first- or second-level committees, the
dispute was to be sent to arbitration. 58 Notwithstanding the grievance
procedure, according to Wright, the union suggested that he obtain counsel
48 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
49 For a discussion of, and citations to, the Gardner-Denver line of cases, see
Daughtrey & Kidd, supra note 5, at 53-56.
50 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
51 For a discussion on post-Gilmer cases, see Daughtrey & Kidd, supra note 5, at
59-64.
52 See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 393 (1998).
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 394.
57 1d. at 393.
58 See id.
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and file an ADA claim.59 Wright did indeed file charges with the EEOC,
and was issued a right-to-sue letter by the agency. 60 In January 1996, he
filed a complaint in federal district court against the South Carolina
Stevedoring Association and six of its member-companies. 61
The case was referred to a magistrate judge. 62 The district court was
charged with deciding whether the magistrate judge was correct to
recommend the dismissal of Wright's action for lack of jurisdiction. 63
Basing his decision on Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass,64 the magistrate
judge provided that he was recommending dismissal because Wright did not
follow the required grievance procedures and that his complaint was subject
to mandatory arbitration. 65
Austin is a Fourth Circuit case that held that the plaintiff was precluded
from bringing a suit for discrimination because his complaint was subject to
mandatory arbitration under the CBA in effect at the time. 66 Wright argued
to the district court that Austin did not apply to his case. 67 He stated
correctly that the CBA in Austin involved a specific nondiscrimination
clause in the collective-bargaining agreement that stated "gender and
disability discrimination claims [are] claims... that are subject to
arbitration." 68 Wright also pointed to a provision in the Austin CBA that
obligated administration of the contract "in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act." 69 Because the CBA in
his case did not contain such specific provisions, Wright argued, Austin
should not apply. 70
The district court rejected Wright's argument that the distinguishing
facts of Austin rendered it inapplicable, stating that Austin was based on
59 See id. at 394.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. CIV.A.2:96-0165-18AJ,
1996 WL 942484, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 1996).
63 See id.
64 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
65 See Wright, 1996 WL 942484, at *1.
66 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 879.
67 See Wright, 1996 WL 942484, at *1.
68 Id. at *2 (quoting petitioner's objection).
69 Id.
70 See id.
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Gilmer.71 In the arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer, the court noted, no
reference was made to the statute pursuant to which the claim was
brought.72 The court also based its decision on the "overriding federal
policy favoring arbitration." 73 Wright appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.74
On appeal, the court agreed with the district court and rejected
Wright's argument that Austin was inapplicable to his case.75 In arguing to
the court of appeals, Wright re-asserted that the arbitration clause in his
case did not specify that the ADA was covered and should thus not apply to
claims governed by the statute. 76 (Again, the language in the CBA was that
it covered "all matters" regarding "terms and conditions of
employment. "77) In rejecting Wright's position, the court noted that the
language in the arbitration clause in Gilmer was at least as vague and
general, yet that clause was still enforced. 78
Wright appealed to the Supreme Court.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
In determining whether the arbitration clause at issue should be
enforced, the Court analyzed the applicability of the presumption of
arbitration for labor disputes that it had previously found present in the
Labor Management Relations Act79 (LMRA).80 The Court noted that such a
presumption should "not extend beyond the reach of the principal rationale
that justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in a better position than courts
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 Id. (citing American Recovery Corp. v. CTI, 96 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 1996)).
74 See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869,
at *1 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997).
75 See id.
76 See id. at *2.
77 Id.
78 See id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23
(1991)).
79 Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
80 See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 395 (1998)
(citing the Steel Workers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)).
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to interpret the terms of a CBA." 81 The Court continued that Wright's
cause of action arose out of the ADA, not out of a contract, and the right
he sought to enforce was "distinct from any right conferred by the
collective-bargaining agreement." 82 Thus, the Court concluded, the
presumption of arbitrability found under the LMRA did not apply to
Wright's dispute.83
Next, the Court held that, if a CBA requirement to arbitrate a statutory
claim is enforceable (something it declined to decide), it must be stated in
"clear and unmistakable" language. 84 The Court based its holding on its
decision in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,8 5 in which it held that a
union could waive its officials' statutory right to be free from antiunion
discrimination only if such a waiver is "explicitly stated" in the CBA. 86
The Court thought "the same standard [is] applicable to a union-negotiated
waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of
employment discrimination,"87 reasoning that Gardner-Denver "at least
stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of
sufficient importance to be protected against [a] less-than-explicit union
waiver in a CBA."88
Also significant to the Court's ruling is its acknowledgement of the
difference between an individual waiving her own rights versus a union
waiving the rights of those it represents.8 9 Specifically, the Court rejected
the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Gilmer, stating that "Gilmer involved an
individual's waiver of his own rights, rather than a union's waiver of the
rights of represented employees-and hence the 'clear and unmistakable'
standard was not applicable. "9
Finally, the Court noted that the CBA in the case before it did not meet
the standard of a clear and unmistakable waiver of the employees' rights
81 Id. (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650
(1986)).
82 Id. at 396.
83 See id.
84 1d.
85 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
86 Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396 (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 708).87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See id. at 397.
90 Id.
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under the ADA. 91 This, the Court stated, is why it did not have to resolve
the Gardner-Denver/Gilmer controversy: in the case before it, the
employee was not required to arbitrate his ADA claim regardless of
whether a waiver of such a right was enforceable. 92 The Court expressly
stated the limit of its holding: "We take no position... on the effect of
[Gilmer] ... in cases where a CBA clearly encompasses employment
discrimination claims, or in areas outside of collective bargaining."93
V. ANALYSIS-GARDNER-DENVER DOES NOT "AT LEAST" STAND FOR
THE "CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE" STANDARD
Since Gilmer, the courts of appeals have been almost unanimous that
what remains of Gardner-Denver is, at the very least, the notion that an
individual's right to have his statutory claim of discrimination adjudicated
cannot be bargained away in a majoritarian process. 94 Indeed, in Gilmer
itself, the Court distinguished Gardner-Denver largely on this basis.
Notwithstanding, recall that in Wright the Court stated that Gardner-Denver
"at least stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum
is of sufficient importance to be protected against [a] less-than-explicit
union waiver in a CBA." 95
Gardner-Denver does not "at least" stand for a rule requiring a clear
and unmistakable waiver. An analysis of Gardner-Denver and the cases
following Gilmer that interpret the surviving meaning of Gardner-Denver
(discussed above) shows that the Court's ruling does not rest on sound
reasoning. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a clear and unmistakable
waiver of the right to a judicial forum under statutes like Title VII and the
ADA alleviate the concerns of union representation of individuals in
arbitration or of such individual rights being bargained away in a
majoritarian process. To state it differently, such a standard is not related to
the concern, to quote the Court in Wright, of "the importance of the right
to a federal judicial forum. "96
If indeed the Court's "rule" were to become the law of the land, a
reasonably competent employer-counsel would simply advise her client to
91 See id.
92 See id. at 397 n.2.
93 Id.
94 See cases cited supra note 6.
95 Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396 (emphasis added).
96 Id.
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obtain explicit waivers as part of the collective-bargaining agreement. If the
clear and unmistakable rule were to take root across jurisdictions, many
more unions would eventually bargain away employees' rights to have their
civil rights claims adjudicated. The doctrine would be a mere formality
with which an employer would have to comply in order to ensure the use of
arbitration and avoid litigation for civil rights claims.
Even if the Court's holding can be characterized as an expression of the
trend of the Court to favor agreements to arbitrate, the clear and
unmistakable rule remains a curiosity. If or when the Court -addresses the
Gardner-DenverlGilmer tension, it will have to make a judgment as to
whether federal statutes, such as the FAA, LMRA, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (Title VII), favor arbitration in the context of collective-
bargaining agreements. 97 In addition, it would seem that at the center of the
Court's analysis would be a weighing of the policies favoring arbitration
and alternative dispute resolution against the policies favoring full access to
a judicial forum for individuals with civil rights claims. Whether a waiver
should be clear and unmistakable does not have a logical nexus with any of
these pressing issues. 98
97 Insofar as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the FAA are concerned, the circuit
courts are split on whether those Acts, read together, endorse or prohibit employer-
employee agreements containing prospective waivers of the right to bring civil rights
claims in court. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,
1192-1199 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and concluding that "Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of
Title VII claims"); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182-183 (3d Cir. 1998)
(discussing the language and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
expressly disagreeing with Duffield, and concluding that Title VII (and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991) is "entirely compatible with applying the FAA to agreements to arbitrate
Title VII claims"); Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that an employee was required to submit his Title VII claim to
arbitration).
98 One might argue that, with the application of the Court's standard for waivers,
individuals would be better protected than without such waivers. This is because it is
likely that not all of an individual's civil rights claims would be subject exclusively to
arbitration. Indeed, it is possible that a union would "only" explicitly bargain away the
right to a judicial forum for a couple of rights; for example, it is possible that only the
disabled (ADA) and older workers (ADEA) would be forced to forgo adjudication
because those were the only statutes or rights explicitly mentioned in the CBA (in other
words, those were the rights the union was willing to bargain away).
Such an argument only serves to illustrate the absurdity of applying the clear and
unmistakable standard to address concerns of individual rights being bargained away in
a majoritarian process. It is not possible for the Court to logically approve of a waiver
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VI. CONCLUSION-THE PRACTICAL MEANING OF WRIGHT
The immediate, practical effect of the Court's holding is probably of
little consequence outside of the Fourth Circuit.99 Notwithstanding, it is
possible, though not likely, that the Court's application of the Metropolitan
Edison rule might encourage a circuit or district court that previously
followed Gardner-Denver to instead apply the rule in Wright-even though
the Court specifically stated it was not deciding whether waivers in
compliance with Wright are enforceable. Indeed, as one somewhat wishful-
thinking analyst from the employers'-bar perspective opined, "the Court [in
Wright] seemed to indicate that there is no absolute prohibition against
union waivers of employees' federal forum rights for employment
discrimination claims."1 00
The truly realistic view of the Wright decision is that the Court ducked
a divisive and controversial issue, leaving lower courts with virtually no
instruction on how to resolve the tension between Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer. 10 1
Michael B. Kass
of a right to a judicial forum for race discrimination claims and to disapprove of a
waiver for ADEA claims based merely on the language used in the CBA. That fewer
rights to adjudication, or only some rights to adjudication, would be bargained away
begs the question as to whether it should be permissible for such rights to be bargained
away in the first place.
99 Recall that, in the context of CBAs, nearly all of the circuits have weighed in on
the Gardner-DenverlGilmer tension in favor of Gardner-Denver. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
100 Vercruysse, Metz & Murray, ADA Claim Is Not Subject to Presumption of
Arbitrability, MICH. EMP. L. LETTER, Dec. 1998, at 3, 3.
101 The failure of the Court to logically address the Gardner-DenverlGilmer
tension raises the question as to why the Court granted certiorari to begin with.
Certainly, the most pressing legal issues related to the case before it revolved around
that tension. See David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Claims Under a
Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caeser Wright, 16 HoFSrRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 53, 66-67 (1998). Feller noted that the Fourth Circuit's opinion contained
no law and was unpublished. Interestingly, he argued (before Wright was decided by the
Supreme Court) that the Court should avoid the Gardner-DenverlGilmer tension and
reverse the case on the narrow ground that the arbitration clause before it did not cover
ADA claims. See id. at 69-70.
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